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Abstract
In this work we explore the implementation of the reputation system for a generic marketplace, describe details of
the algorithm and parameters driving its operation, justify an approach to simulation modeling, and explore how
various kinds of reputation systems with different parameters impact the economic security of the marketplace. Our
emphasis here is on the protection of consumers by means of an ability to distinguish between cheating participants
and honest participants, as well as the ability to minimize honest participant’s losses due to scam.
1 Introduction
The importance of automated reputation assessment in online communities has been the focus of several studies
over the past decade, as it can be found in the earlier works of the other authors: [Zheng and Jin, 2009],
[Swamynathan et al., 2010], [Sänger and Pernul, 2018]. This topic is particularly interesting given the growing
interest in distributed interaction systems and marketplace platforms, where suppliers and consumers are connected
on a peer-to-peer basis [Gupta et al., 2003]. The ability to build reliable reputation systems gets especially critical in
the case of densely populated marketplaces with anonymity of participants [Androulaki et al., 2008].  In such
marketplaces the trustability of most of one’s peers involved in interactions can not be verified other than on basis of
personal experience, so that public reputation systems based on collaborative feedback can potentially help  [Blömer
et al., 2015].
The scope of our work extends ideas relying on graph analysis where oriented social graphs [Garin and
Mescheriakov, 2019] make it possible to extract social relationships between the participants of the society or
marketplace and assess trustworthiness of each of the participants based on the volume of social experiences in the
market environment [Kolonin, 2019]. 
Given the generic design of a reputation system for artificial and online societies [Kolonin et al., 2018]  presents an
overall framework for building reputation systems, in this work we focus on implementing a simplified version
serving the marketplace environment and on adjusting system parameters suitable for this case. For the latter
purpose, we design and perform simulation modeling that would enable one to figure out the appropriate set of
parameters for maximizing the system’s ability to satisfy its requirements. The key principle of the system remains
the “weighted liquid rank” algorithm [Kolonin et al., 2018] which defines a computation of reputation based on
explicit ratings being exchanged with by market participants, weighted by values of respective financial transactions
and taking into account the reputations of the raters issuing the ratings themselves. 
The primary requirement of the reputation system is assumed to be to provide the ability to identify scamming
agents that cheat the reputation system by pumping their reputations with worthless fake services, that is,  it should
provide “security”. Secondarily, for the agents that are asserted as fair participants, the reputation system is required
to provide the ability to assess their level of service appropriately, having it correctly represented in a reputation
rank, that is,  it should grant “equity”. As part of granting “equity”, the system should make it possible for novel fair
agents entering the system to be recognized and not be suppressed by system,  so as to grant “openness”. 
2 Reputation System Implementation  and Parameters
In the scope of this work we substantially simplify the original design [Kolonin et al., 2018] of the reputation
system, leaving multiple domains and dimensions out of the scope of consideration and abstracting from different
implementation options. Here we focus on implementation details of the “weghted liquid rank” algorithm and the
multiple algorithm configuration parameters to be explored during the simulation modeling.
2.1  Reputation System Overview
In this work, we have explored reputation systems that may consume either implicit ratings Qij corresponding to
financial transactions made by agent i to agent j as or explicit ratings Fij  between agents that may be optionally
weighed with financial values of corresponding transactions conducted between the agents.
The rating system for explicit ratings was designed with a continuous rating scale defined in range between 0.0 and
1.0, which could be mapped to range 0% to 100% with 0.0 or 0% meaning complete dissatisfaction and 1.0 or 100%
standing for complete satisfactions. For practical applications and simulations of the reputation system it could be
used with discrete rating values of “five-star” rating system, where 0,0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1.0 would imply
unsatisfactory, satisfactory, good, very good, end excellent, respectively. Alternatively, it could be thought in terms
of possible downrating or negative rating indicated with value 0.0 while the remaining four values of 0.25, 0.5, 0.75
and 1.0 would represent “four-star” system of positive rating.
The implementation of the reputation system used in this work is based on the incremental computation model, so
that a reputation state computed at the end of a previous observation period is used to compute a differential
reputation update during subsequent observation periods.  The previous reputation state is then blended with the
differential update into the new reputation state.  Each reputation state contains the reputation ranks of all agents
known by the end of a given observation period.
2.2  Reputation System Parameters
In the implementation of the reputation system that we have explored, the following parameters were used:
 Rd - default initial reputation rank in range 0.0 to 1.0 - given to newcomer agents initially;
 Rc - decayed reputation in range 0.0 to 1.0 - to be reached by agents eventually if they have no ratings;
 Fd - default explicit rating to assume if it no rating is left by rater, in range 0.0 to 1.0;
 C - conservatism in range 0.0 to 1.0 as a blending (“alpha”) factor for mixing previous reputation rank 
recorded at the beginning of the observed period and a differential one obtained during the observation 
period;
 P - precision as a decimal number like 10.5 or 0.01, used to round/up or round down financial values or 
weights as value = Round(value/precision);
 Weighting - with this boolean option set to True,  the reputation system weighs explicit ratings with 
normalized financial values ( 0.0 to 1.0) , and with it set to False it leaves the explicit ratings unweighted; 
 FullNorm - with this boolean option set to True the system performs a full-scale normalization of 
incremental ratings,  and with it set to False it has limited normalization, without lowering the minimum 
values to zero level;
 Liquid - with this boolean option set to True the reputation system accounts for rank of the rater when 
computing incremental reputation updates;
 LogRanks - with this boolean option set to True the reputation system applies the log10(rank) function to 
reputation ranks during normalization;
 LogRatings - with this boolean option set to True the reputation system applies log10(1+value) to financial 
values used for implicit ratings and financial weights used for weighted explicit ratings;
 Aggregation - with this boolean option set to True the reputation system aggregates all explicit ratings 
between each unique combination of two agents by computing the weighted average of ratings across the 
observation period;
 Downrating - with this boolean option set to True the reputation system translates original explicit rating 
values in to range 0.0-0.25 to negative values in the range -1.0 to 0.0 and original values in the range 0.25-
1.0 to the interval 0.0-1.0. 
 UpdatePeriod – the number of days to update the reputation state, considered as the observation period for 
computing incremental reputations.
2.3  Reputation System Algorithm and Implementation
The following describes the implementation of the “weighted liquid rank” algorithm [Kolonin et al., 2018] used in 
the present implementation of simulation system described later in this paper. 
1. For each observation period end date t, the reputation state at the last day t-1 of the previous observation 
period is retrieved as a list of reputation ranks Rit-1 of every agent i at day t-1. 
2. Either implicit financial ratings or explicit ratings for the observation period between t-1 (exclusively) and t
(inclusively) is retrieved.
3. Optionally, if the Aggregation option is set to True, all Nij ratings per observation period per each unique 
combination of rater agent i and rated agent j are averaged, so that the average implicit financial rating Qij, 
and unweighted explicit rating Fij may be computed for further use, in order to prevent excessive uprating 
or downrating between specific agents. 
Qij = Σt Qijt /Nij , in case of implicit financial ratings
Fij = Σt Fijt /Nij , in case of unweighted explicit ratings
4. Optionally, if the Precision parameter is set to a value other than 1.0, the financial values of the implicit or 
explicit ratings are re-scaled with Qij = Round(Qij  / Precision).
5. Optionally, if the LogRatings option is set to True, financial values of the implicit or explicit ratings are 
scaled to logarithmic scale as Qij = If(Qij  < 0, - log10(1 - Qij ), log10(1 + Qij )), where negative value may 
be corresponding to the case of transaction withdrawal or cancellation.
6. Optionally, if the Downrating option is set to True, the explicit ratings are translated from range 0.0 - 1.0 to 
range between -1.0 and +1.0, based on threshold value 0.25, so that Fij = If( Fd < 0.25, (Fd  - 0.25)/0.25, (Fd 
- 0.25)/0.75 ).
7. For the volume of the ratings for the observation period, either aggregated or not aggregated, the 
differential reputation update dRi for every agent i is computed in one of the three ways, for implicit 
financial ratings, unweighted explicit ratings or weighted explicit ratings, respectively, as follows. In each 
of the following cases, if the Liquid parameter is set to False, the reputation of the rater for the previous 
observation period is disregarded so that Rjt-1 = 1. If the Liquid parameter is set to True but the reputation of 
the rater for the previous period is unknown yet, it as assumed to be default rank as Rjt-1 = Rd. If the explicit 
rating is not known for given transaction between agents, it is expected to be default rating Fij = Fd :
dRit = Σj (Qij * Rjt-1 ), in case of implicit financial ratings;
dRit = Σj (Fij * Rjt-1 ), in case of unweighted explicit ratings;
dRit = Σj (Fij * Qij * Rjt-1 ), in case of weighted explicit ratings.
8. The differential update dRit  for the observation period t is further normalized to range between 0.0 and 1.0 
with optional logarithmic scaling to ldRit = log10(1 + dRit), if LogRanks is set to True, and optional full-
scale normalization, if FullNorm is set to True:
 
ndRit = dRit / Max(dRit), if LogRanks=False and FullNorm=False;
ndRit = (dRit - Min(dRit)) / (Max(dRit) - Min(dRit)), if LogRanks=False and FullNorm=True;
ndRit = ldRit / Max(ldRit), if LogRanks=True and FullNorm=False;
ndRit = (ldRit - Min(ldRit)) / (Max(ldRit) - Min(ldRit)), if LogRanks=True and FullNorm=True;
9. The ranks from the earlier observation period are blended with normalized differential ranks with taking 
into account conservatism, as shown below. In the case that the reputation rank for the previous observation
period Rit-1  is not known, default Rd  is used instead. In the case that Rit-1 is known but there is no update 
ndRit observed in given period, Rc  is used instead. That means, the reputation curve of the agents would 
start with Rd  and approach Rc  on inactivity eventually as an average across agents, yet further 
normalization adjusts reputations across all agents to the uniform range so the actual numbers may be 
different. 
Rit = Rit-1 * C + ndRit * (1 - C)
 
10. The computed blended reputation ranks are finally normalized to the range between 0.0 to 1.0 and stored to
be used for computing reputations at the end of the next observation period.
In the scope of the project, the reference implementation of the reputation system has been initially done within the
scope of open source Aigents Java project as the Reputationer class. For overall implementation details see
Reputationer class in https://github.com/aigents/aigents-java/ and for blending and normalization functions refer to
Summator class in the same project. The Aigents Java implementation of reputation system is provided with a
Python adapter for SingularityNET reputation system prototype (see the aigents_reputation_api.py script in the
https://github.com/singnet/reputation/ project). The latter project is also hosting further porting of the system to
native Python implementation (see the reputation_service_api.py script).
3 Reputation System Simulation
In order to explore the reputation system design described above we have performed an initial round of simulation
modeling. The simplistic simulation was used to perform a cursory exploration of the market conditions and
parameters of the reputation system using simplified market behavior, to see if the reputation system can work on
certain market conditions or not, what kind of the reputation system provides the best “security” and “equity”, and
what the optimal system parameters are.  
3.1 Simulation Requirements
In our simulations, it was expected that amount of “good” agents with “honest” behaviors in the market is 80% of
the population and the amount of “bad” agents committing “scams” are the remaining 20% so that the market was,
in a sense, “overpopulated” by scammers. During the simulations, it was also assumed that the amount of
transactions committed by “bad” agents is somewhat higher than the amount of transactions of by the “good” agents,
so the “bad” agents are cheating by having the reputations of “fake” suppliers pumped up by “fake” consumers. It
was also assumed that an average “bad” agent spends substantially less on every transaction, compared to an
average “good” agent who, being honest, are actually making real purchases while scamming agents are spending
money just in order to fool the reputation system. In the described study, in all simulations it was assumed that any
of “bad” agents emits 10 times more transactions a day than the good one, but the ratio of average transaction
payment amount varied. For the latter ratio, we considered three typical conditions: an “unhealthy” market with a
ratio equal to 10 (so that the “good” agents have just 10 times more costly purchases), a “semi-healthy” one with a
ratio of 20 and a “healthy” one with a ratio of 100.
We have explored different ratios between amounts of “good” agents performing “honest” behaviors in the market
and “bad” agents committing “scams”. The following different ratios between percentages of consumers and
suppliers were considered: 1) everyone is consumer and supplier, 2) 50% are consumers and 50% are suppliers, 3)
80% are consumers and 20% are suppliers, 4) 90% are consumers and 10% are suppliers. The whole range of ratios
was explored in the course of initial simulation studies and the latter one ( 90% consumers per 10% suppliers) was
used for fine-tuning of system parameters in a way that corresponds  to real-world marketplaces, as we have
discovered in our studies in the field. We have studied real world marketplaces and what is a share of buyers vs
sellers there. In our study we took into account 16 mature marketplaces for which we were able to collect data on the
ratios of buyers vs sellers. This data was collected from publicly available information that those companies posted
or the analysts estimated. These are all online marketplaces, ranging from huge marketplaces in broad markets such
as Amazon, to very niche marketplaces such as Algorithmia. We then assessed those ratios based on how reliable
they are (number of buyers and sellers might have had inaccuracies, such as counting inactive buyers, etc.) and how
similar the niche is to ours (an AI as a service marketplace). We found this ratio 9:1 (9 times as many buyers than
sellers) to be the most realistic.
The behavior of the “good” agents was such that any “good” consumer performs a random or semi-random search
for suppliers and provides semi-random “positive” rating in the range of 0.25 to 1.0 to a “good” supplier. However,
whenever a “bad” agent is selected by a “good” agent, the former is rated with “negative” 0.0 rating and never
selected for purchase again. 
The behavior of the “bad” agents was such that “bad” consumers provide fake “positive” 1.0 ratings to “bad”
suppliers and never give a rating to “good” suppliers. 
All simulations were performed in four different modes: 1) consumers do not use the reputation system to make a
choice for supplier, so they pick either randomly or based on their own previous experiences; 2) consumers use a
“traditional” reputation system running on the basis of explicit ratings that are not weighted by financial transaction
costs; 3) consumers are using a reputation system running on the basis of explicit ratings weighted by financial
transaction costs; 4) consumers are using a reputation system running on the basis of implicit financial ratings,
which are financial transaction costs.
Different scales of the simulations were explored, for the market parameters and behavioral patterns above - 10
agents interacting during 10 days, 100 agents interacting during 3 months and 1000 agents interacting during 6
months. 
The simplistic simulation, which code is available under the https://github.com/singnet/reputation/, project in the
reputation_scenario.py script was assuming a completely random selection of suppliers by consumers, with only
two exceptions. First, the “bad” suppliers experienced by “good” consumers in person were never selected by the
latter again so the bad experiences were remembered by each of the honest agents. Second, when “good” consumers
used the reputation system to select suppliers for purchase, with the choice restricted to only suppliers with
computed reputations exceeding a reputation rank value equal to or  above the 40% mark. 
3.2 Simulation Performance Metrics
We have examined a few kinds of performance metrics for the reputation system. The first kind of metric measures
the effect of the reputation system on the economy.  The financial metrics serve to identify the amount of financial
resources that fair consumers lose to scams, or the relative amount that scammers would earn by cheating the
reputation system so they can be referenced to evaluate the economic value of a reputation system. The second kind
of metric are just technical measures of the performance of the reputation system in terms of its accuracy. The latter
metrics assess the degree to which we can identify scammers, assign appropriate ratings to good agents or solving
both problems at the same time.
We present two metrics of financial kind: Cgbg  - “loss to scam”  - a ratio of volume of transactions spent by good
agents Vgb to bad agents over the entire volume of the spending by all good agents Vg .  Second, we have Cgbb
-“profit from scam”  a ratio of the volume of bad agent earning transactions from good agents Vgb  over the
spendings of bad agents Vb. The working reputation system would be expected to minimize both Cgbg  and Cgbb , the
“fair” market’s loss to scam and the profitability of scam.
Cgbg = Vgb / Vg  , “loss to scam”
Cgbb = Vgb / Vb  , “profit from scam”
We also explore metrics that assess the accuracy of the reputation system’s prediction of whether each agent is good
or bad, and ability of the reputation system to have a high accuracy for both assessments. These metrics compare
distributions of expected reputations Rea per agent a against lists of computed reputations Rca for the same set of
agents. The scale of Rea is used to assess the reputation system’s ability to predict “bad” agents, such that bad agents
are expected to have Rea = 0, and good agents are expected to have Rea = 1. 
The Pearson correlation coefficient PCC(Re a , Rca) between Rea  and Rca, different forms of accuracy for good, bad
and mean as well as root-mean-square deviation metrics have been used to compare Rca against Re a , as follows.
Using these metrics, reputation system would be expected to provide values above zero at least, with values above
0.5 as a reasonably good result and values close to 1.0 as excellent results. 
The accuracies for evaluating “good” agents Ag and “bad” agents Ab were defined as follows, assuming that the Rca
and Rea, are both defined on interval from 0.0 to 1.0, representing “goodness” with good agents ultimately having a
value of 1.0 and bad agents ultimately having a value of  0.0. Respectively, we can consider R~ca = 1 - Rca and R~ea =
1- Rea , representing “badness” with the inverse meaning. In the following, we essentially compute weighted average
values of computed “goodness” and “badness”, with expected values used as averaging weights. 
Ag = Σa (Rca * Rea) / Σa (Rea)
Ab = Σa (R~ca * R~ea) / Σa (R~ea)
The metrics above would let us maximize the value of the system’s ability to correctly identify the “good‘ and the
“bad” independently, and the following value of mixed average Am could let us measure the extent of maximizing
the both.
Am  = (Ag + Ab) / 2
As a possible alternative for accuracy metrics above, we have used root-mean-square deviations, defined separately
for “goodness” Dg and “badness” Db and mixed Dm as in the case of the accuracies above. These metrics give the
level of error in identifying different sorts of agents correctly, with 1.0 being the worse and 0.0 being the best. The
mixed deviation, Dm , represents a traditional error measure while specific Dg  and Db are computed with weighted
averages of square deviations with expected “goodness” and “badness” values as weights, respectively.
Dm = √(Σa((Rca - Rea)2) / N )
Dg = √(Σa((Rca - Rea)2 * Rea) / Σa(Rea) )
Db = √(Σa((R~ca - R~ea)2 * R~ea) / Σa(R~ea) )
3.3 Simulation Results
The following results were obtained and analyzed in order to explore the market conditions which make the
reputation system work at all, as well as the combinations of parameters that make it work to greater extent. 
Figure 1. Using or not using reputation systems based on different kinds of ratings for fixed system reputation system parameters
with different market conditions. Columns 3-12 –reputation ranks for metrics are computed aside and not communicated to
agents, columns 13-22 – agents use a reputation system to choose suppliers by consumers. Rows 1-3 – the reputation system is
based on explicit ratings, not weighted by financial values, rows 4-6 – the reputation system is based on explicit ratings, weighted
by financial values, rows 7-9 – the reputation system is based on implicit ratings, provided by financial values. Rows 1,4,7 –
transactions made by good agents are 10 time more valuable than ones spent by bad agents, rows 2,5,6 – transactions by good
agents are 20 times more valuable, rows 3,6,9 – transactions by good agents are 100 times more valuable. Reputation system
parameters are: default = 0.5, conservativity = 0.5, decayed = 0.0, full normalization = true, logarithmic ratings = false,
downrating = false. The coloring is used to outline ranges. Green means a reasonable range, i.e. strong positive connections
between expected and obtained reputations (above 0.75 for PCC and accuracy and below 0.25 for RMSD). Yellow means a semi-
reasonable range, i.e. positive connections between expected and obtained reputations (between 0.25 and 0.75 for Pearson and
between 0.5 and 0.75 for Accuracy, between 0.5 and 0.25 for RMSD and scam profitability). Orange means an unreasonable
range, i.e. no connection between expected and obtained reputations (below 0.25 for Pearson and below 0.5 for Accuracy, above
0.5 or RMSD and scam profitability). Note that the reasonable (green) range for loss to scam is below 1% and for profit from
scam it is below 10%. 
For a reputation system, to be working,  we expect it to be able to solve two goals at once. Primarily, it would make
it possible to identify “bad” cheating suppliers supported by cheating consumers so the that the overall loss that
“good” agents making purchases suffer would be brought to minimum, granting “security” for the market. Second,
the reputation system should make it so that every “good” agent will not be not misrecognized as a “bad” one,
ideally having the reputation level computed for the good agent corresponding to actual quality of their service so
the “equity” on the market is preserved as well.      
Figure 2. Using the reputation system with fixed market conditions and varying reputation system parameters. Rows 1-17 
corresponds to the case when transactions by good agents are 20 times more valuable, in general, and rows 18-25 – to the case 
when this ratio is 100 times. In both cases, the population of bad agents was 20% and each bad agent had 10 times more 
transactions than any of the good agents. Columns 3-4 show “profit from scam” and “loss to scam” ratios for the case when the 
reputation system is not used by agents while columns 12-23 hold these ratios for the case when the reputation system is used 
with different sets of parameters indicated in columns 5-11. Columns 14-21 show parameters for Pearson, accuracy, and root-
mean-square deviation. The coloring scheme used is the same as on Fig.1. The optimal (“winning”) set of parameters is 
underlined at row 6, with balanced optimum across metrics. 
The simulations have been run for three different market scales - 10 agents during 10 days, 100 agents operating
during 3 months and 1000 agents operating during 6 months. For these scales, average transaction cost ratios
between “good” and “bad” agents were explored at 10, 20 and 100. All combinations of ratios between consumers
and suppliers as listed above were explored as well. Also, different reputation system parameters were tried for the
market scale of 1000 agents operating during 6 months and transaction cost ratios 20 and 100. For every run, the
following metrics were computed were computed and collected with selected examples shown on Fig.1 and Fig.2.
 Vg /Vb - good/bad volume ratio for market
 Cgbb - profit from scam
 Cgbg - loss to scam
 PCC - Pearson correlation between expected and computed “goodness”, averaged across period and latest 
at the end of the period 
 Ag - accuracy for “goodness”
 Ab - accuracy for “badness”
 Am - mean accuracy for both “goodness” and “badness”
 Dg – root-mean-square deviation for “goodness”
 Db – root-mean-square deviation for “badness”
 Dm – overall root-mean-square deviation
Based on the studies ad numbers on Fig.1 and Fig.3 and similar results for other market conditions, the following 
observations were being consistent across different market scales and reputation system parameters.
 Using non-weighted explicit ratings did not work under any of the conditions that we tested, and so it 
was never possible to get any of the metrics A far from 0.0 and any of the metrics D close from 1.0, which 
implies that traditional reputation systems may not work under such conditions. This was also backed up 
with the fact that the  Cgbb value for either using a reputation system or not using it were the same, so that 
neither the loss of good agents to scam nor the profit of bad agents from scam depended on the use of such 
a reputation system. Whether this holds true for real marketpances needs further studies with more realistic 
simulations matching specific market parameters, including the scamming populations percentage, 
transaction ratios, volume and amount ratios and rates of newcomers and leavers. 
 Using either financially weighted explicit ratings or implicit financial ratings alone makes it possible 
to decrease “loss to scam” and “profit from scam” both.  Given “healthy” market conditions it is also 
possible to get all PCC and A metrics close to 1.0 and D close to 0.0 with Cgbg and Cgbb decreased up to 10 
times, depending on other market and reputation system parameters.
 Using explicit ratings weighted by financial values works the best, granting generally higher PCC and A 
metrics and lower D metrics and being able to grant noticeable increase in Cgbg and Cgbb  values in both 
“healthy” and “semi-healthy” market conditions.
 For target market conditions of 90% consumers and 10% suppliers, for the case of 1000 agents acting 
during 6 months, regardless of the explored market volume parameters, use of the reputation system 
makes it possible to keep “loss to scam” (Cgbg) value under 1% and “profit from scam” (Cgbb) under 5% 
and, decreasing them up to ten times for “semi-healthy” and “healthy” markets.
 Use of the reputation system by agents effectively decreases precision of  it because it saves “good” 
agents from experiencing “bad” agents and making “negative” ratings less effective than if the consumers 
were selecting suppliers blindly. That implies that there is no way to secure everyone in a truly distributed 
reputation system, because some “good” agents have to suffer from “bad” ones in order to save the rest 
with their ratings. However, it makes it possible to minimize the level of overall suffering for “good” agents
and make “bad” agents much less profitable.
 There is a tradeoff between minimizing the level of overall suffering (granting “security”) and ability 
to recognize well-performing but less popular agents (granting “equity”) in “unhealthy” and  “semi-
healthy” market conditions so that a higher Ag and a lower Dg are connected with a lower Ab and a higher 
Db , or the other way around, depending on the reputation system parameters. This implies that better 
recognition of “good” agents or better “equity” costs unrecognizing some “bad” agents while perfect 
“security” leads to worse “equity” so that some of the good agents are misclassified as “bad” ones. 
 The parameters Weighting=True, FullNorm=True, LogRatings=False have turned out to be necessary for 
the reputation system to work across all tried market conditions. The other parameters had no impact on 
results in “healthy” conditions. However, for “semi-healthy” conditions, lower conservatism C has 
provided noticeably better “security” sacrificing the “equity” while higher default has provided slightly 
better “equity” and “security” both. In turn, increase of decayed reputation Rc has substantially increased 
“equity” but has also made “security” substantially worse. Finally, use of Downrating=True made it 
possible to decrease Cgbg and Cgbb (“loss to scam” and “profit from scam”) to the factor of 10, compared to 
variations of all of the other parameters, making them 10 times less than in the case when the reputation 
system was not used, however the cost of that came in the form of a low Ab and higher Db, apparently 
because “bad” agents evicted from selection list quickly were not getting enough low ratings and were thus 
given the chance to appear in shortlist above 40% over and over again. 
 Given the above analysis and the numbers on Fig 3., the best combination of parameters has appeared to 
be FullNorm=True,  Weighting=True, LogRatings=False, Rd=0.9, C=0.1, Rd=0.0.
 A special case is provided with Downrating=True setting ,underlined at row 14 on Fig.2, which needs more
studies in the future research under more realistic market simulations. 
 Highly negative Pearson correlation (above 0.95) has been found between A and D families of metrics 
which has suggested that only one of them may be used for assessment of the reputation system 
performance in the further research. Similarly, high positive Pearson correlation has been found between 
PCC and Am values suggesting that only the latter measure or its counterpart Dm may be used because the A 
and D families make it also possible to evaluate performance for “security” and “equity” independently. 
 Highly positive Pearson correlation (above 0.9 in case or reliably working reputation system in use) has 
been found between the Vg /Vb ratio and PCC values, implying that the ability of the reputation system to 
grant “security” and “equity” both is bound on the “health” and descends as the scam starts to prevail in the
environment.  
 Positive Pearson correlation (around 0.5 in case of a reliably working reputation system in use) has been 
found between PCC and Cgbb , which is connected with correlation to Vg /Vb which means that lesser 
fraction and volume of scamming transactions on the market and/or better accuracy of the reputation 
system provide greater the profitability for those few who still perform scamming behavior and manage to 
fool the reputation system.
4 Conclusion
Based on the scope of performed work, we can conclude the following.
 For the studied market conditions, use of reputation system based on explicit ratings weighted by financial 
values of committed transactions provides both “security” and “equity” for the honest participants of the 
market, which suggests a need for further research in this direction with more realistic simulations.
 Use of a traditional reputation system with explicit ratings, under studied conditions, could be misleading in
such market conditions providing neither “security” and “equity”. In our study, the use of financial costs as 
implicit ratings is almost as good as use of explicit ratings weighted by financial values, but still provides 
less  “security” and “equity”. Further research is required to confirm these claims applied to real cases and 
to find the borderline conditions when this really start taking place. 
 For extremely unhealthy market conditions it may be more safe to not use a reputation system that relies on
everyone’s personal experience as the reputation system may be cheated if the volume of scam-driving 
transactions is comparable to the volume of fair transactions.
 The use of a reputation system has side effects such as  a) losing accuracy in identifying scamming 
participants because they are not being experienced by users .   b) having honest agents miscounted as 
scamming agents or having actual performance of the honest agents under-evaluated. Potentially, both 
tradeoffs may to be avoided with careful system parameter tuning and implementation of extra policies for 
the process of making choices of suppliers on behalf of consumers. More research is required in this 
direction.
Our further work will be dedicated to the following.
 Making the simulations more realistic, exploring larger scales of markets above 1000 agents and 6 months, 
studying wider ranges of possible market conditions with different populations of scamming agents, 
different ratios of transactions committed by the agents and implementing different temporal patterns of the
behaviors of the agents, primarily having different rates of newcomers and leavers,  and introducing the 
notion of real transactional costs so the profit from scam may become tangible.
 Evaluating the possibility of improving “security” and “equity” with the use of rating aggregation and with 
the simulation of the staking-based [Kolonin et al., 2018] reputations as well as exploration of its impact on
improvement of “equity”, in respect to newcomers - especially.  
 Explore the possibility of an implementation of dynamic reputation threshold management that has 
homeostatic control of the system enabling dynamic control on the threshold value separating “most likely 
scam” and “most likely honest” based on the rates of overall customer satisfaction in the system, such as 
percentage of non-zero ratings , or average rating value for the past period.
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